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Abstract: This paper examines informal credit practices in a remote Hungarian village. It explores the 
central role informal credit plays in people’s present and future social security as they strategize about using 
various resources amid large-scale unemployment and limited local resources. It furthermore explains the 
reasons for the local prevalence of the former, the ways such credit is used by individuals and families vis-à-
vis other informal and formal arrangements, and how the users are morally judged. The analysis puts special 
emphasis on the links between individual practices of informal credit, the distributional practices of the local 
state, and broader socio-political tendencies. In doing so, the study reveals that the indebtedness of the local 
government and its short-termist distributional practices on the one hand, and the indebtedness of local 
unemployed people and the short -termism evident in their spending on the other can be linked to the same 
phenomenon; namely, the rescaling of insecurities. 
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[Exciting, frightening music plays]… Little birds happily chirp in a nest of straw, but 
suddenly the nest breaks and one falls. The fallen bird, chirping with fear, tries to 
climb back into the nest with no success. A big scarecrow appears, looming over 
the birds, it moves towards the broken nest; the birds chirp anxiously… [the music 
suddenly changes into a relaxed and comforting tune]… The scarecrow takes his hat off, 
carefully creates a more stable nest inside his hat, placing the fallen bird back into the 
new and safer home…  “If you only need a little more, don’t hesitate to call Evident”1 
– purrs the voice-over as the TV advert ends. Evident, which was set up in 2001, is 
the biggest private loan company in Hungary. Its success lies in offering, according 
to their website, “short-term, small-scale loans for customers with no guarantor or 
financial coverage.”2
Another quite different “advert” appeared in several places across Budapest before 
the local government elections in October 2010. Featuring a picture of a mosquito in 
1 The name of the company is anonymized; the pseudonym is borrowed from Judit Durst (2015a).
2 This was particularly true during the time of research.
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the middle of a red circle, firmly crossed out with a red line, the poster, which was part 
of the campaign by the far-right political party Jobbik, asked, “Do you also want to 
put an end to parasitism?” Although the imagery was utilized by an extremist political 
force, it resonated with the predominant sentiments of many.
Eight years have passed since the appearance of these two events, yet the processes 
that they signify have only intensified. The main line of division, on which the Jobbik 
election poster visibly played, has become even stronger. It is located between those 
who have permanent employment and hence contribute (or have contributed) to the 
“common good” as “good tax-payers,” and those who live from social transfers, and 
hence are the “parasites” of the system. The social policies of the current conservative 
government, which clearly favour those with regular employment, and redistribute 
from the poor to the rich, have only exasperated this situation, making the distinction 
between deserving and undeserving citizens even stronger (see Ferge 2017). The 
latter are left without any or very little assistance, and face the curbing of social rights 
and increasingly punitive measures (Szikra 2014), further exacerbating feelings of 
insecurity. The value of different welfare transfers has not been increased since 2008, 
while the criteria for receiving means-tested benefits has become stricter, reducing the 
number of recipients. Moreover, the central state has considerably reduced its role as a 
welfare provider, with insecurities notably affecting a much wider circle, and the most 
marginalized long-term unemployed are left, for the most part, to look after their own. 
The popularity of Evident and similar credit companies is more closely related to 
the above-described processes than first might appear. At the time of research, Evident 
had 225,000 customers,3 predominantly from poor rural areas, without permanent 
income, and who were stuck in spirals of indebtedness (see Miklósi 2006; Durst 2015a). 
Amid ongoing discursive (re)negotiations that focus on which citizens are deserving or 
undeserving of state support,  the possibility of obtaining social security has altered 
significantly. This is especially true in rural areas, where the changing role of agriculture 
and transforming ownership relations have significantly altered the access of different 
groups to productive resources. In many places this has resulted in a massive reduction 
in available jobs. Further to this, while in the early 1990s the political economic 
transformations brought new opportunities, more recently many remote rural areas 
have increasingly been faced with limited or no external investment or funding, and the 
shrinkage of services and lack of institutions leave the oft-changing state-run “public 
work programs”4 as the only larger employer (Velkey 2017).
In these places, smuggling, collecting wood and mushrooms, reliance on “loan 
sharks” or the buying of food on informal credit in shops can be of utmost importance 
in the social security arrangements of large segments of the population (cf. Messing–
3 According to statistics on their website.
4 This is a scheme that links the receipt of social aid by the unemployed to attendance in publicly organized communal work. 
It involves low-skilled temporary jobs provided by local governments, paying salaries below the minimum wage, financed 
primarily from central government budgets. It was first introduced in 2009 and has since become one of the main government 
measures for tackling unemployment.
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Molnár 2011; Durst 2015a). While all these strategies might not be available in every 
settlement, in Tiszacseke,5 a remote village in North-East Hungary, some of these 
practices are widely present. In fact, half of the regular customers of local shops buy 
on informal credit on an everyday basis. Furthermore, advances on aid and public-
work-related wages are regular occurrences at the local government, and many locals 
report they have taken Evident loans multiple times in their life.
Throughout my study, I use the concept of informal credit to describe all 
moneylending arrangements which do not abide by any institutionalized, legally 
binding format. In this paper I particularly focus on two forms: arrangements in 
local shops between shopkeepers and their customers, and arrangements at the local 
government between the mayor and social beneficiaries/public workers. What is 
particularly important about these two forms of credit is that no interest is charged, 
and they are so frequently used in the village that they have become part of the regular 
household budgeting of many locals. 
In addition, I discuss some of the ways these informal practices are linked to the 
regular use of Evident loans, which were particularly prevalent at the time of research 
in the village. Even though this is not an informal practice, the credit constructions 
and the logic and the conduct of the company’s local employees were often strongly 
connected to usury and the activity of loan sharks by the villagers, especially because 
most villagers used the “home service” credit package whereby an agent personally 
brings the loan and then collects the installments from the customer on a weekly 
basis. While there are no loan sharks in the settlement, Evident loans were discussed 
as a kind of usury and were often only used as a last resort if one could not turn 
elsewhere. As I will later show, the intensified use of this formal practice can be linked 
to the same broader socioeconomic transformations that exacerbated the frequent 
use of other informal credit options in Tiszacseke.
The paper examines the role that these widespread practices of informal credit 
and Evident loans have in the social security arrangements of the inhabitants in the 
village: What are the reasons for their prevalence? How are they used by individuals/
families vis-à-vis other arrangements and how are they judged in the local context? 
The analysis highlights the multiple connections between individual practices of 
informal credit and the distributional practices of the local state, underlining that 
they are all related to the same broader phenomenon: the rescaling of insecurities. 
Informal credit, state restructuring and social security
Anthropologists have long been concerned with various credit practices (cf. Peebles 
2010), emphasizing that debt cannot be reduced to mere economic relations; it also 
involves social relations loaded with and constituted by moral values and obligations 
5 All names in the text are anonymized, and pseudonyms are used for the names of the settlements.
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(see e.g.: Gudeman 2001; Hann – Hart 2011; James 2014; Durst 2015b). Furthermore, 
different meanings can be attached to debt, which, while constantly negotiated by 
individuals, is also strongly connected to local contexts and structural constraints 
(Guérin 2014). Informal credit relations have been increasingly examined along these 
lines and my analysis adds to these efforts.
Informal lending has been an important constituent of local socioeconomic 
relations in different historical and geographical contexts (see Latea – Chelcea 2003; 
Graeber 2011). However, its current form and prevalence in Central and Eastern 
Europe is strongly related to the socioeconomic transformations of capitalist 
restructuring accompanied by the more recent withdrawal of the state from some of 
its social functions (Latea – Chelcea 2003; Messing – Molnár 2011; Durst 2015), which 
has particularly strongly affected remote rural areas. In these places the disappearance 
of former employment options, the gradual erosion of the means of commuting to 
industrial jobs, the break-up of collectives, the transformation of land ownership and 
more general access to land, and the changing productivity of agriculture has resulted 
in the narrowing of local resources and intensified people’s anxieties and feelings of 
insecurity both about their present and future situation. At the same time, informal 
practices, including accessing credit, have gained renewed importance among people’s 
coping strategies. 
Ethnographic work that strictly focuses on informal credit practices and their link 
to the survival strategies of the poor in Hungary is still very limited (with only a few 
exceptions, such as Messing – Molnár 2011; Durst 2015a, 2015b). However, these 
studies focus, for the most part, on usury, (an exception in the field of sociology is the 
recent PhD dissertation of Gosztonyi [2018]). Undoubtedly, usury is one of the most 
dominant forms of informal credit in poor rural areas, although other forms of the latter, 
such as buying on credit in shops or taking advances on social benefits, appear similarly 
significant for poor households that are trying to cope with multiple insecurities. Latea – 
Chelcea (2003) discuss the sudden rise and new form of such practices in rural Romania 
that accompanied post-socialist restructuring. In the former case, cash scarcity affected 
a much wider segment of society and was related to continuously delayed payments 
of all kinds (credit from banks, taxes from firms, wages from firms/state, and social 
transfers from the state) that permeated the entire economy. 
While the situation is somewhat similar in Tiszacseke, there is a crucial difference. 
In the Romanian example, precisely due to the dominance of a “delayed payment 
economy” and a widespread shortage of money at various levels, informal credit was 
a socially accepted practice based on strong communal ties and thus was also given to 
people who were tightly linked to the local community, (i.e. not only the long-term 
unemployed and poorest inhabitants, but also pensioners and low-wage earners). 
In comparison, the people who participate in these transactions in Tiszacseke (and 
similar villages in Hungary, as shown by Kozma et al. 2004; Virág 2009; Messing – 
Molnár 2011) are usually marginalized; they are less advantageously positioned 
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in local social structures and networks, hence are left with very limited resources 
to draw on. What is more, buying consumer goods on endlessly renewed credit is 
considered shameful and invites the moral judgment of the local majority with regard 
to consumption practices, financial management, and the lifestyles of the users of 
credit, despite being common practice among the local unemployed (Szőke 2012).
While the importance of informal credit for the survival strategies of the poor is 
often discussed, no systematic effort has been made to analyse these practices within 
the wider social security arrangements of individuals/households. According to Franz 
and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, a broader anthropological understanding of social 
security should go beyond formal institutional provisions and include all forms of state 
and non-state, formal and informal arrangements, practices, relationships, ideologies, 
policies and institutions that are utilized by individuals, groups or families to overcome 
present and future insecurities related to their existence (1994: 4). According to this 
approach, people make various arrangements and draw on different resources in order to 
cope with present and future insecurities, often rooted in past experience. Accordingly, 
insecurities are not only material but are often experienced as feelings of anxiety rooted 
not necessarily in actual present needs but rather linked to the possibility of having such 
needs satisfied in the present or the future. As Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 
put it, “the most devastating uncertainties concern people’s most basic needs: food, 
shelter, health and care; and in connection with them the experience of destitution, of a 
sudden loss or severe reduction of the means of existence and of access to other people 
or social institutions which might provide help” (1994: 7).
Analyzing informal credit relations by deploying the above social security 
approach leads to two important results. First, we can uncover the complex and 
multiple connections between these individual credit practices and the distributional 
practices of the local state, which although important is usually overlooked. Second, 
it furthers current efforts which highlight that, contrary to the dominant view, taking 
on informal credit without financial coverage is not due to “irresponsibility” or “bad 
planning” inherent to the poor, but rather is related to particular socioeconomic 
situations and larger structural processes that push the responsibility of dealing with 
insecurities down onto individuals, families and localities. 
The political economic transformations after the collapse of the socialist regime 
in 1989 triggered a substantial restructuring of the state in Hungary. They entailed, 
among other things, the decentralization of welfare provisions, changes in financing 
and the institutional frames of development, and the setting up of autonomous 
local governments. As a result, local officials along with a number of regional, micro-
regional, civic, and – with EU accession – supranational actors gained prominence in 
mediating access to various resources (Szőke 2012). 
However, state restructuring did not mean the hollowing out or withdrawal of the 
state (cf. Goodwin – Painter 1996; Peck and Tickell 2002; Brenner 2004), but rather the 
reorganization of the spatial scales on which regulations, welfare and responsibilities 
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are constituted. It involved the devolution of a large number of responsibilities from 
the central state to local authorities, as well as to individuals and their families. 
Actors at these scales are increasingly encouraged to look after their own needs and 
contend with the aggregated effects of political economic restructuring, while central 
financing and welfare provision are continuously shrinking. As part of the neoliberal 
restructuring process, there was a move to fight against perceived dependency on 
state assistance, the introduction of workfare measures, and the narrowing of social 
rights (cf. Peck 2002; Castel 2005; Clarke 2005). This was particularly apparent at 
the time of and immediately after the 2008 economic crisis in Hungary. Whereas 
current waves of re-centralization, ongoing since 2010, have taken away many of the 
former powers of local authorities, they still bear a large part of the responsibility for 
dealing with unemployment, poverty, and related social tensions, while the centrally 
allocated means of doing so have been continuously reduced (Ferge 2017). Similarly, 
the individualization of social problems coupled with the punishing of poverty has 
further intensified (Szikra 2014 ; Ferge 2017).
These ongoing undulations of state restructuring have significant impacts on 
the ways people can make arrangements for their present and future social security, 
drawing on and strategizing between both formal state provisions and arrangements 
with relatives, neighbors, NGOs and religious organizations, among others. I 
describe these broader processes as the “rescaling of insecurities,” which refers to 
the relegation of certain (often formerly centrally provided) securities to the level of 
local government or individuals/families (often with no parallel financial coverage), 
but also the structural constraints emanating from capitalist state restructuring that 
are fundamentally changing the ways in which individuals, groups, and organizations 
can mobilize their efforts and resources to establish their social security. This paper 
deals with one particular aspect of this phenomenon – the ways local families, on 
the one hand, and local government, on the other, try to cope with the concomitant 
insecurities. As will be seen below, the two issues are closely interlinked.
The research context
Tiszacseke has a young population: most of the 1600 inhabitants are of active age 
and the number of children is relatively high. One quarter of the local population are 
considered to belong to the Roma minority. Unemployment has seriously affected 
the area, especially since the closing of the manufacturing branches of collectives and 
due to the decline of the agrarian sector. There are only two large enterprises, both in 
the nearest small town, but only a handful of people from the village work there. The 
region preserved its predominantly agricultural orientation even during socialist-era 
industrialization, during which a large number of people commuted to other regions 
and within the area for their livelihood, or worked in local collectives. After the local 
cooperatives were dissolved, many lost their employment opportunities and the 
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possibilities for commuting were severely disrupted, which also contributed to the 
high unemployment rate in the area. 
Currently, the local government is the largest employer, operating numerous 
institutions such as a school, kindergarten, and assistance for the elderly. Besides 
these opportunities, the few larger farm owners employ two-three regular workers 
and rely on further seasonal laborers for a few months a year. There are also a few small 
family businesses in the village, such as shops, pubs, a hairdresser, a restaurant, a few 
guest houses and a camping site. Thus local employment opportunities are scarce and 
for many are restricted to seasonal agricultural labour in orchards or cucumber fields. 
I have had more than a decade-long involvement in the village, during which time 
I returned several times for shorter and longer research visits. However, most of 
the material I use in this article is based on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork 
spread between two visits from July 2009 to August 2010.6 The research7 involved 
repeated semi-structured interviews with all important state officials in the village, all 
the shop-keepers, and a total of 60 in-depth interviews with local inhabitants. These 
focused on their interaction/relations to local state officials, their social situation 
(sources of living, position in local society, relations to other groups/locals), and their 
practices or strategies of establishing their own and their families’ social security. In 
addition, I regularly made ethnographic observations in shops, as well as in various 
local state institutions such as the mayor’s office and various sites of public work, 
and frequently accompanied the nurse and the family assistant on their family visits 
and became part of the everyday life of numerous families, observing their practices 
and everyday conduct. Through these observations and interviews I gained access 
not only to the ways locals describe their practices, motives, values and relations to 
each other, but also how these interpretations relate to their actual everyday conduct 
of using credit, making calculations and plans for their immediate or far future, 
earmarking money according to the source of money and spending purpose, and 
reproducing or negotiating public norms about deservingness and undeservingness. 
While I had access to most of the actors involved in the credit relations I describe in 
the article, my material on Evident is restricted to how the company is interpreted by 
local customers, local state officials and using online material.
“It’s not possible to live from this” – Individual insecurities
The number of people who have had no permanent employment for a long period is 
very high in Tiszacseke. According to the local government, 90 percent of the active 
aged population are affected. Many live on social transfers (among which childcare 
and family benefits constitute a large part) and from wages for public work. Since 
6 The ethnographic present described in the text refers to this period.
7 The research was conducted within the frame of a comparative research project called “Local State and Social Security in 
Rural Hungary, Romania and Serbia 2008-2011” based at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, funded by the 
Volkswagen Foundation. 
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the 1990s the mayor has organized a large-scale public work program, employing 
200-240 beneficiaries8 yearly, long before the nationwide 2009 “Road to Work” 
program saw similar practices throughout Hungary. He considers it one of his major 
responsibilities and an important way of preventing people from falling into deep 
poverty and curbing a rise in usury or crime (Szőke 2015).  
The local government is the only large-scale employer in the village and public 
work has substituted permanent employment for many locals for over two decades. 
In several cases it has become a permanent job for participants; numerous informants 
reported that they have worked in the program continuously for over ten years, albeit 
on short consecutive contracts. It also involves a wide range of people, from unskilled 
to qualified, from fresh job-seekers to aging inhabitants, and both men and women. 
Another significant factor is that great emphasis is put on equally employing Roma 
and non-Roma inhabitants, who usually work together in both skilled and unskilled 
jobs, although the Roma are more frequently found in the latter. This effort also 
relates to the fact that in the village both groups are equally affected by the widespread 
unemployment.9
In addition, seasonal work in agriculture, tourism or opportunities in the 
“informal” economy (such as reselling goods brought from Ukraine, smuggling petrol, 
or doing small-scale informal repair work) can bring additional resources to many 
families. A growing number also engage in cucumber cultivation, which brings some 
extra income during summer months. Apart from this, families in which there is one 
or more unemployed member receive the social benefit of 28,500 Ft a month, which 
since 2010 has only been available to one person per family and has since decreased 
to 22,800 Ft. In such cases, the other adult members a) receive childcare allowance; 
b) are taken onto the public work program and receive the minimum wage10 for a 
few months, which also counts in terms of the number of days in employment that 
can result in higher unemployment benefit; c) receive a pension (or usually old-age 
assistance); or d) do not receive any social aid. However, due to the encompassing 
public work scheme in Tiszacseke, the latter cases are relatively few, although they 
still exist. 
Most people in permanent employment in the village receive the minimum 
wage. Even in families where one member works in a local state institution, the 
other member(s) are often unemployed or only have irregular income from small-
scale selling of fruit, unofficial repair work, or periodic involvement in public work. 
However, those unemployed villagers whose partner has a stable job and regular 
source of income are still in a somewhat better position than those who do not have 
such an option. The former can find small jobs here and there through the network 
8 At the time of the research an average of about 80-120 people were usually employed for 3-6 month periods, thus the 
programme overall affected over 200-240 people yearly.
9	 For	more	details	on	the	local	public	work	program	and	its	effects,	see	Szőke	(2015).
10 Its value has changed several times since the time of research. Currently, the public work wage is around 60% of the minimum 
wage.
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of their better positioned partner, whose connection to a local state institution 
provides access to several other resources, including information about temporary 
job opportunities, occasional work at local government assets, or in private houses/
gardens, and free goods distributed among local state employees. Such free items can 
include regular food from the institution’s kitchen, used furniture or leftover building 
material, or house furnishings from the renovation of institutions, and were often 
mentioned as a big bonus for those who work in or are connected to people working 
for local state institutions. 
Moreover, their partner’s stable income also makes the family eligible for bank 
loans. A  better social position  in local society – here meaning that one has friends 
or members of one’s extended family in long-term employment or in other strategic 
positions (i.e. close to the mayor or other officials) in the local social structure – also 
contributes to social security. This can secure support, information, and access to 
other resources from parents, colleagues or friends who are likely to engage in long-
term reciprocal relations of mutual help. This was mentioned often by several families; 
the sentence “you can never know when you yourself will need help” was a frequently 
used explanation for such mutual help relations. At the same time, this might not 
be available so easily to (or often even known about by) those families in which all 
members rely on benefits or occasional earnings, hence have narrower networks and 
less intense contact with people in strategic positions. 
The case of the local family assistant, Szerénke, is one such example. Her husband 
has been unemployed for several years, only doing occasional jobs as a welder. 
However, she has been employed since she finished college, first in the nursery, and 
then in the local social service office. For that reason, her husband was never taken 
on for public work, as according to the mayor their situation was not so bad with 
one regular earner in the family. But Szerénke can participate in village festivals on 
a regular basis, from which all officials take home a large amount of free food, and 
she gets additional food vouchers at her workplace. Her husband has undertaken 
several repair jobs for other officials and local government institutions. And, more 
recently, he became employed in the water company for a short-term period when 
they needed an extra worker, with his personal contact with the dam keeper, another 
well-embedded person in local society, securing the job.
In spite of officially relying on only one minimum-wage income for years, the 
couple have managed to finance their child’s higher education and language exam, 
buy a larger house with a bank loan, and live a relatively stable life in the village – 
i.e., they do not have debts in shops, they do not rely on (but also could not receive) 
benefits, and they do not have problems with paying their bills. Furthermore, they sell 
apples from their half-hectare orchard every autumn which brings in some additional 
income; they have a web of relatives and friends with whom they are in a close helping 
relationship, and thus during the harvest they do not have to pay helpers. However, 
in return they also do the same for those who have helped them, or return the favour 
Review of Sociology, 2018/4120
in other ways, such as through electrical repair work. Such arrangements appeared 
to be very prevalent in the village with families or individuals that are socially more 
advantageously positioned having a much wider network and access to a greater 
variety of resources.
A different villager, Éva, and her husband were out of regular employment for 
over four years, as were many of their friends. Éva used to work for one of the local 
shops, but after she reached the end of her maternity leave, she was not taken back. 
Then the couple decided to have a third child, and she now receives child support 
and has been unemployed for over seven years. The couple grow cucumbers, and last 
year Éva worked as a day labourer for a few days in orchards, but she could not find 
other employment opportunities. Her husband used to work for one of the largest 
landowners in the region but had been poisoned with pesticides, and since then 
could not find regular employment. He was engaged in “small business” (i.e. “getting, 
reworking and reselling stuff”) as well as working as an agricultural day labourer 
whenever possible. He was finally taken on for public work in Spring 2010 for six 
months. The couple bought their house with a loan through a social scheme which 
they are still repaying, continuously rely on credit in shops, and often struggle to 
pay their bills and other household costs (for example, when their washing machine 
broke). They find it especially difficult in the winter months when there are reduced 
opportunities for seasonal work or additional jobs.
The situation of these two families is in many ways typical of others in Tiszacseke 
regarding social security; the example of Szerénke for those who work in official, 
long-term employment, and Éva for those who rely on social benefits and irregular, 
often unofficial labor opportunities. According to my field experience, as well as the 
accounts of local social workers, the main dividing line in local society in terms of 
social security arrangements does not unfold along the usual ethnic lines (between 
Roma and non-Roma) as often mentioned in relation to poverty in the context of 
Hungary, but rather between those with permanent employment on the one hand, 
and those who only have occasional jobs on the other and thus who rely on public 
work or social aid.11 As the two above-described stories show, having a regular wage 
does not necessarily mean receiving a larger income, but it offers a kind of security, 
allows future planning, and gives access to a wider range of resources than small 
irregular jobs. Linda, a local mother, summarized the problem thus: 
You cannot save up from social aid. [The related amount] 28,500 Ft is hardly enough 
to live on. And the banks don’t give credit to you unless you can prove six months of 
employment. Also, public work… some are taken on for years and years non-stop, you 
can see, but my husband wasn’t called in to work for ten years, only now they gave him 
three months of work. And again, for three months you cannot ask for bank credit, 
and even if they extend his contract and he can stay for another three to four months, 
11 This is, of course, not to say that racism plays no role in securing permanent work in the village or in the region.
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it won’t be enough. They will give a new work contract for the new period. So again, 
we can’t go to the bank. How can one advance then? It’s impossible, it’s impossible…  I 
would also like to renovate my house, of course I would. I also don’t like to live like this 
– do you think I do? But I can’t, this social aid is only just enough to live on. 
Having a regular income makes saving possible, even if with difficulty, and above 
all it permits some sort of future planning. The latter is almost impossible when 
inhabitants are exposed to continuously fluctuating and shrinking social benefits 
or constantly shifting public work schemes, both of which have changed multiple 
times during past decades. In addition, one cannot plan when engaged in agricultural 
or minor manual jobs, especially when many orchards are increasingly remaining 
untended due to the low price of fruit, or employ Romanian laborers from across the 
border at a lower wage. As the lives of the above families show, when you only have 
a very small income, which is hardly enough to satisfy your most immediate needs, 
the practice of economizing to obtain future rewards remains only an idea. The mayor 
very acutely summed up the issue:
When they come to me and complain that they don’t have enough money, I tell 
them “what do you want? How come you cannot live from 28,500 Ft?!” And then 
I tell them, “you go and buy some bread every day, that’s 310 Ft,” because here the 
cheapest bread costs 310 Ft per kilo, not 160 Ft like in the city, so that’s 10,000 for 
a month. Then you go and buy a bucket of fat, which is 2500 forints, that’s again 
10,000 Ft a month, and then I tell them, “at least you won’t starve.” But then I 
pause. Because what am I saying?! We are already up to 20,000 Ft, and they have 
only bought bread and fat for the family. The rest they pay the bills from, and that’s 
it, we haven’t done anything yet, just eaten. So, I stop, because what can I tell them?! 
I also feel that something is very, very wrong.
The instabilities and insecurities caused by financial poverty, the impossibility of 
future planning due to frequent central changes in social benefits and public work 
programs, and the dependence of families on the discretionary decisions of local 
officials are visible in people’s living standards; for example, with regard to house 
renovations and investments in furniture or other household goods. One crucial 
practice that is only undertaken by those without regular employment is buying 
everyday goods on credit. My interviews reveal that regularly buying on credit in local 
shops is considered to mark this dividing line between those who have regular jobs 
and those who do not. The shameful situation of having to rely on credit is strongly 
connected in the minds of locals to unemployment and a reliance on social benefits. 
This situation was also reflected in the account of the head of elderly assistance 
program when she talked about her earlier experience of being unemployed, and the 
feeling of insecurity and shame that had accompanied it:
I was also unemployed and my husband too. So, I know. My colleague, Szerénke, 
doesn’t know yet, that’s why she cannot value her job. She was always in employment. 
I was unemployed for several years before I started to work here... And my husband 
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also didn’t have a job at the time. So, I know how it feels…. It was horrible. Constantly 
waiting and hoping that one of us at least will be taken on for public work. And then you 
never know for how long or when it will happen. So, you had to do all sorts of things. 
Many times I went and did the worst jobs, like shoveling snow or collecting rubbish 
from the street. And I did it for very little money, because if you didn’t, you might not 
be called in for better jobs when there was a chance. So now I really appreciate my 
job, because I know how it felt to be so insecure. And OK, it still happens sometimes, 
because it happens to everyone here, but my biggest fear is that I will have to “go on the 
list” (iratkozik12) again. I’m trying everything to avoid this.
However, even though such possibilities can easily threaten everyone in 
Tiszacseke, as the above account shows, most people in permanent employment or 
with regular income such as a pension have a rather negative view of the practice of 
regularly buying on credit. The nationwide discourses about being lazy, over-spending 
and thoughtlessly buying “luxurious goods” (such as cola, crisps, or cigarettes) are so 
deeply inscribed that even personal experiences do not contravene them. It is these 
nationally dominant images that are also used by many in Tiszacseke to delineate 
those who are “deserving” and “undeserving” in the local context. Similarly, having 
many children in poor families is often evaluated as a strategy to “take as much out of 
the state as possible”; i.e. to give birth to children in order to receive family support 
and numerous child benefits.
Many inhabitants with permanent employment even believe that the various 
benefits the unemployed receive amount to a greater income than their minimum 
wage. These opinions, however, reflect more the injustice that those in permanent 
employment (who as noted above receive only the minimum wage) feel towards those 
who receive several benefits and are without a job, than the actual amount the latter 
receive. Rather, it reflects broader social tensions and feelings of injustice towards the 
redistributive logic of the state, and deep-rooted public sentiments also enhanced by 
current social policies concerning the stigmatization of benefit users as “misusers” 
and “parasites” on the state. Such tensions between those who work in low-paid 
jobs and those who are long-term unemployed are especially high in areas with poor 
economic assets and scarce opportunities like Tiszacseke. 
In addition to the particularly benevolent social policy of the local mayor, there are 
certain additional resources that the officially unemployed can turn to. One of these is 
small-scale agricultural production, mostly cucumber-growing for those who do not have 
additional resources to invest in anything larger, or who have not inherited much land. 
In terms of area, cucumbers can bring in as much as 1800-2000 Ft per square meter if 
the soil is good and the weather is favourable. Accordingly, for 600-800 square meters 
of cucumbers, which is the most common size of plot in Tiszacseke, one can earn more 
12 This is a local expression used to describe the situation when someone asks a shopkeeper if they can be written onto the list 
of debtors, but it also became a local colloquialism to express the entire phenomenon of buying on credit. As such, it not 
only describes one particular instance, that the interviewee here mentions that may still often happen to anyone, but rather a 
continuous regular and prolonged practice, when debts can never be fully balanced.
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than 1.5 million Ft in a season. Even in less favourable conditions growing cucumbers can 
bring in at least 600-800,000 Ft for 3-4 months of work. Even if one deducts the initial 
loan given by the wholesaler13 and the smaller investment into nets, sticks and additional 
treatment materials, people can augment their income by a significant sum. However, 
the work is very intensive, and involves a minimum debt of 150,000 Ft for 600 square 
meters that needs to be paid back to the wholesaler once the cucumbers start growing. 
Furthermore, cucumbers are very sensitive plants that are easily affected by the weather 
and various diseases, so one can end up with a debt at the end of the season. All the above 
factors therefore make cucumber growing an attractive yet risky option.
As mentioned above, people living from an irregular and small income can ease 
their situation by purchasing goods on credit from local shops.14 According to one of 
the biggest shopkeepers, 50 percent of her customers regularly buy on credit. Another 
recently opened shop offers credit to every customer without exception and without 
limit as a customer attraction strategy. Thus, by the second month after opening, many 
people were shopping there, accumulating as much as 30-50,000 Ft debt per month. 
Those who regularly buy on credit balance some of their debts at the beginning of each 
month after receiving their social benefits or public work wage, but the next day come 
again and ask if they could buy on credit. Borrowing from family or friends, another form 
of informal credit, also plays an important role in local social security arrangements. 
However, this is mostly limited to small sums and occurs during exceptional events 
or crises such as sudden sickness, the death of a relative, the threat of being refused 
informal credit at one of the local shops due to a large outstanding balance, weddings, 
baptisms or school graduation parties. Similarly, the mutual practice of borrowing 
everyday food products such as flour, sugar, coffee and cigarettes is also important in 
times of need (for example, when credit in shops is frozen when the mutually agreed 
limit is reached). Of course, such practices have long existed. However, the regular use 
of credit in shops, Evident loans, and advances from the local government are relatively 
new, and are more closely linked to ongoing socioeconomic transformations.
The dilemma of the shopkeeper, Evident, and their best 
customers
“You cannot refuse to give bread or milk to a mother when you know she has three 
children,” explained Kati, the owner of a shop located near the main road in the village,
13 This involves a formal arrangement whereby a farmer signs a contract with the wholesaler. The wholesaler pre-finances the 
initial plants, the nets, sticks and pesticides which are given to the farmer at the start of the season. Once the cucumbers 
finish growing, the farmer delivers them to the wholesaler, who first deducts the initial loan from the price to be paid for the 
cucumbers. Only once this debt is balanced does the farmer get the money for the cucumbers delivered to the wholesaler. 
In some cases, other constructions also exist, mostly based on long-established personal trust relations (e.g. by gradually 
deducting the loan from each batch of cucumbers delivered throughout the season, so the farmer can receive some money for 
the very first batch delivered to the wholesaler).
14 There are a total of five grocery shops in the village, and they all sell on credit to a number of customers.
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...[but] it is a different thing if they ask for alcohol, then I often don’t give credit. But, for 
example, for cigarettes, I do. I somehow think it is not my job to teach people what is good 
or bad. But they often buy other goods too. When they ask me if they can get another 
1000 Ft credit, and I tell them “yes,” thinking that they will get some yogurt or some 
bananas for their children and they will eat better, then they go and buy tomatoes for 
800 Ft per kg. In winter! Even I don’t buy them in the winter! Or the Bonduelle tinned 
corn which costs double the price of the other type. Then I get very mad. But I still give the 
credit to them... what can I do?!
As she went on to explain, it is mostly larger families with many children who rely 
on credit. Elderly people are too ashamed to ask, even if they need it. However, these 
large families are considered “the best customers,” even if they buy on credit, because 
they shop daily and for numerous goods. While elderly people usually just buy bread 
and milk (as they grow vegetables and keep livestock in their gardens), larger families 
usually buy several things to cook with; meat from the freezer, vegetables, washing 
powder, sweets for the kids and soda such as Sprite or Coke. “If it weren’t for them, 
we might close the shop,” admits Kati. Other shopkeepers also felt they were in a way 
forced to offer credit to these families (cf. Latea and Chelcea 2003), otherwise they 
would lose their biggest and most frequent customers, even if this means they only 
get a part of their money back and always with some delay. As one shopkeeper put it, 
“we know that eventually they will pay for it, otherwise they won’t get more credit. 
And if they don’t pay here or the other shops, eventually no one will give them credit, 
then they can go to the city. They will see who gives them credit there!”
Through the continuous giving of credit, the shopkeepers bind their customers to 
their shops. Indeed, this is a part of some shopkeepers’ strategy for dealing with local 
competition. As Angéla, a 43-year-old mother of four children, explained in regard to 
the newly opened shop which started to attract customers by offering unlimited credit,
...The first time I just asked for 1000 Ft credit, as I didn’t have enough money with 
me for the washing powder. I forgot to buy it at the nearest city. We usually go there 
when we get social aid and shop for the whole month. Then the next day I went to 
the shop again, and he [the shopkeeper] said I could shop some more if I needed to, 
he’d just write it on the list. So, I bought cola, the expensive one, not the cheap one, 
some crisps, and some cigarettes and some other stuff I don’t remember, food to eat. 
I didn’t really need all that, but since he said I could buy things…. I know it was 
wrong. We usually don’t drink Coca Cola, just the cheap type. But he said I could get 
more credit, so I bought it. It all came to over 8000 Ft, so then I owed 9000 Ft. By 
now, I owe over 30,000 Ft, and I don’t know what will happen, because it’s only the 
beginning of the month, and we [the family] only have 120,000 Ft altogether. If I 
pay this debt, and buy our monthly food for 60,000 Ft, there are still the bills, and 
we will have nothing left. Then I will have to buy on credit again.
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Shopkeepers15 entangle some of their regular customers in webs of attachment 
and deepening debt. Customers feel they can take more and more goods. Even though 
they cannot balance their debts now or in the foreseeable future, they nevertheless 
keep on buying and, as they do so, any reservations they have about being in debt 
evaporate, as they return each month to pay off some of the debt, and also take a 
little more (cf. Latea – Chelcea 2003). Another, much larger creditor, Evident, works 
according to an alarmingly similar logic. 
In answer to my question about what happens if individuals suddenly need larger 
sums (in the case of sickness, for a flat renovation, or for a new electrical appliance, 
etc.), Sándor, a charismatic member of the Roma local government, answered without 
hesitation, “we call Evident.” In contrast to a bank, this loan company offers credit to 
people who have no secure income or guarantors. He went on to explain,
They ask for almost 100 percent interest, it’s like usury, nothing different. A person 
comes as soon as the next day after you call, asks about your income. You tell them 
you only get the 28,500 Ft of aid, and family benefits. And then he gives you the 
money as soon as the next day, he brings it to your house. Then you have to pay 
back some part at the end of every week. The agent from the company comes to your 
house and asks for your weekly instalment. It is just like the loan sharks. The only 
difference is that it is legal, it’s a company. And they really give credit to anyone, it 
doesn’t matter if you don’t work or have no salary, just your social aid and the family 
benefits. … I was also in it [borrowed from Evident], twice. It took me two years to 
get out of it. But I had to take it. Once I took 60,000 Ft for the funeral of my aunt, 
and once another 30,000 Ft – we needed it for food, there was no other option then, 
nowhere else to go. I paid the installments for two years, often I had to borrow from 
friends to pay them, and still didn’t manage to clear my balance… It really is the last 
option – you only go there [borrow from Evident] when there is nowhere else to go.
Evident is often the only option (apart from loan sharks) for those without a 
permanent job if they want to obtain larger sums of money. At the time of the research, 
the company offered loans of up to 220,000 Ft even to people whose sole income 
was social aid or public work, and often asked for 80-100% interest on short-term 
small loans through the home service scheme.16  While it was not detailed as such 
on their credit scheme table, a closer look showed that if one took 100,000 Ft credit 
over a 30-week instalment period, 153,000 Ft would have to be paid back. Over 60 
weeks the sum could amount to 177,750 Ft, which could further increase if the client 
failed to pay back the amount by the end of this period, which often happens. This 
15 The perspectives and motives of the shopkeepers are also multiple; however these did not constitute the focus of my research. 
Yet it was often said that selling on credit is not advantageous to them, and in most cases ends up in losses, thus they need a 
minimum number of cash-paying customers in order not to run at a loss. However, the former reasoned that in a locality with 
a limited number of cash-paying customers, offering credit was needed for survival, as eventually most credit is balanced, even 
though only in small sums and stretched over an extended period. Giving credit furthermore binds customers to the shop; the 
loyalty of customers (in terms of where they bought, and what) was a constant topic of shopkeepers during my research.
16 This service is used by the majority of clients from poorer and/or rural backgrounds as it does not require a bank account and 
assistance is offered with all related paper work, arranged directly at the home of the customer.
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situation changed slightly with the 2014 regulation on credit rates, and the company 
has also changed its credit profile, although its most often used services still target 
the “unbanked.”  
Buying on credit and borrowing from Evident entangles people in circles of debt 
with little possibility of repayment in the near future. What is more, constantly offering 
new credit without ever expecting full repayment incites further consumption – this 
has parallels with the logic of giving credit cards or large bank mortgages to clients 
without comparable guarantees, discussed extensively in relation to the 2008 global 
crisis. Whereas some of these options (i.e. buying on credit or taking Evident loans) 
may be vital for securing the present and future needs of many families, in the longer 
term it appears that such practices are strategies for dealing with the insecurities 
generated by structural processes at higher levels. 
Delineating various reasons for the current spread of consumer credit, Rona-
Tas and Guseva (2018) argue that the current culture of consumerism fueled by 
advertisements and cultural messages incites various classes to go into debt to ensure 
their status quo, which they can only reach by upscaling their consumption. The 
authors explain that, following the neoliberal turn, “curtailing social programs and 
government spending amounted to pushing the problem of demand management onto 
[...] households, which had no other choice but to deepen their reliance on consumer 
credit” (p. 57), creating a second form of exploitation. In Tiszacseke, this is also partly 
true. Elsewhere I argue (Szőke 2012) that the seemingly luxurious or irresponsible 
spending of the poorer segments of the village is in fact a way to renegotiate their 
social belonging and counteract dominant notions about deservingness. 
The local government, and informal credit
Buying on informal credit appears to be entangled with the practices of the local 
government in several ways and on many levels. The first and the most obvious is that 
the mayor himself also engages in distributing informal credit of a type. Advances are 
frequently given from the public work wage and then deducted from the public work 
salary at the end of the month or over consecutive months if the advance is large. 
Numerous workers told me that this option was of great help to them. Undoubtedly, 
it is sometimes used to save families from immediate crises (for example, surviving 
until the next payment if every other resource is already used up),  meaning they do 
not need to go to loan sharks or Evident, where high interest would be due on the 
sum they borrow. In these cases, only a few thousand Ft is advanced that is usually 
spent on basic necessities such as food, or is used in case of sudden sickness or severe 
indebtedness to balance some debt. 
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Of crucial consideration here is that the local government could distribute a one-
time benefit called crisis aid17 meant exactly for such situations. However, according 
to local statistics and personal accounts, very few people have received it in past years. 
The social service clerk explained that officially it can be given, but since it should 
be covered entirely from the local budget, they cannot distribute it frequently. The 
case was similar with funeral aid, which could be also distributed from the local 
government budget. Thus, in the few cases when it was given, it was usually given 
in the form of credit (i.e. deducted in small installments from the applicant’s aid or 
public work wage). Thus, due to limited local government resources, advances on the 
public work wage partly fulfilled the same role as crisis aid, although in the form of 
credit. 
Nevertheless, these advances were typically taken for a larger sum (80-160 
thousand Ft) and, similar to the income from growing cucumbers or day labour, were 
used for larger investments that could not be realized from the low public work wage/
benefits. Most often the money was used for renovating houses, building bathrooms, 
or taking the first steps towards cucumber farming.18 The importance of these 
advances was emphasized by many, because it is not possible to obtain bank loans for 
such investments based only on a public work wage19 or social aid. 
Renovating houses has an importance that goes beyond increasing the immediate 
comfort of families. A significant portion of the unemployed families had had their 
children placed under supervision (védelembe véve) at one point, which means that 
the child protection officer visited them on a weekly basis, monitoring the parents’ 
child-raising practices, financial background and, above all, living conditions. These 
supervisory orders were usually due to cases of under-age pregnancy, parents’ 
suspected alcoholism, or, most frequently – as the child protection officer put it – 
“financial circumstances that threatened the well-being and desirable living conditions 
of the children.” 
On the various occasions I accompanied the child protection officer and the local 
nurse (védőnő) on these visits, the houses were inspected for heating facilities, the 
presence of windows and doors (that were often missing), and clean rooms with 
proper walls and beds (preferable separate ones) for children. If the family failed to 
remedy at least some of these shortcomings over a period of time (usually one year), 
they were threatened with the permanent removal of a child or children. Whereas such 
extreme measures were only taken four times in the period 2005-2013, the threat was 
extensively used by local officials and discussed in families thus threatened, and was 
17 Since the 2015 changes in the social aid system, crisis aid does not exist any more, but a new benefit called local government 
aid (települési támogatás) may be awarded which now substitutes crisis aid, regular social aid, funeral aid, and irregular child 
protection benefits.
18	 For	more	details	about	the	earmarking	of	different	sources	of	income	and	the	values	attached	to	them,	see	Szőke	(2012).
19 Even those who are employed more or less constantly in public work as regular employment are taken on through short-term 
contracts which would not make the earner eligible for bank loans. This was explained to be a major barrier to making larger 
investments by many informants. 
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thus often mentioned in considerations about house renovations. Similarly, being 
selected for public work often involved a discretionary decision by the mayor about 
who was deserving and who not, something which was often influenced by other 
local state officials’ opinions and information about the applicants. Keeping one’s 
house tidy or trying to “manage on one’s own” by, for example, growing cucumbers or 
undertaking small renovations and repair work on a house played an important part 
in this.
Though many people spoke in positive terms about the advances, some of the 
officials had serious reservations. Advances do not follow legally regulated structures 
(they are based on informal arrangements, but still have to be financed from a very 
strict, pre-calculated carefully balanced monthly budget). The local government 
struggled to carry out many of its tasks, as is often the case in remote villages with 
small assets and large social expenses, and was even forced to switch to heating the 
school and nursery with wood for two consecutive winters in 2009-10. Moreover, the 
local government has been struggling with the repayment of large bank loans, and 
often refused locals’ requests for emergency benefits, as mentioned above.
These practices of the local government can be associated with the indebtedness 
and spending practices of local needy on another level too. Namely, both seem to 
be linked to larger political economic phenomena that increase the insecurity of 
individuals/families and local authorities. Due to the devolution of responsibilities 
in the field of welfare, with no matching financial support, this is felt particularly by 
those who are least advantageously situated in the present structures, both at the level 
of individuals and the local government. The one-hundred-million forint deficit with 
which the local government starts the year cannot all be covered from local income as 
resources are scarce and the number of taxpayers (and enterprises) is limited. 
This is a problem faced by many local governments across the country: either 
some institutions are closed down and local services abolished (which many local 
offices are reluctant to do), or the local government relies on newer and newer bank 
loans to make up its budget deficits. The indebtedness of the local government sector 
rose from 14 percent in 1991 to 70 by 2010 (Vigvári 2011:69). After local resources 
from selling local government assets were exhausted by the end of the 1990s, local 
governments increasingly started to rely on loans to compensate for the decreasing 
central contributions and lack of monetary resources (Pálné Kovács 2008). Thus, by 
the end of 2000 indebtedness on a mass scale had occurred (Vigvári 2011:71), a fact 
which became particularly apparent as the central financial deficit after the 2008 
Hungarian economic crisis was pushed down particularly effectively to the local scale.
Due to the continuing devolution of welfare provisions, local governments are 
also pushed to deal with the social consequences of capitalist restructuring, such 
as unemployment, social and ethnic tensions and poverty, on their own. The local 
government in Tiszacseke, due to the lack of appropriate financial coverage, has 
to resort to rearranging its targeted grants within its budget and to take on large 
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debts to maintain local institutions and services. Thus, in order to maintain a large 
and expensive public work program, which the mayor argues is key to keeping social 
tensions in check, it often uses money from central grants that is targeted at other 
mandatory tasks. Crucially, however, it is not within the local government’s power 
to create and maintain employment or to fundamentally change the long-term 
local socioeconomic situation of the settlement. In the same way, local unemployed 
inhabitants have little power to fundamentally change their situation and escape 
the spiral of indebtedness and poverty. There are temporal similarities between the 
local government and those who buy on credit in shops; i.e. both focus on the most 
urgent matters, and invest resources into “fire-fighting,” rather than trying to make 
investments for the future. 
Last but not least, the local state plays an important role in local informal credit 
practices in another sense. Several shopkeepers in Tiszacseke explained that they do 
get back some of their credit at the time of the payment of the public work salary. In 
addition, they added, it is best when many people are taken on for public work, because 
then less credit is asked for, and more of it is balanced each month. However, since 
public work programs have been more or less continuously operating for many years, 
shopkeepers are for the most part confident that these debts will eventually be repaid. 
Conclusions
The neoliberal reforms, privatization, disappearance of employment opportunities 
and decreasing involvement of the central state in providing social security has led 
to new forms of insecurities in people’s lives. At the same time, discourses of self-
help and the repeated individualization of social problems, along with the increasing 
withdrawal of the central state from welfare provision, have also meant that the 
responsibility for finding solutions to socioeconomic problems and the consequent 
socio-spatial inequalities have been devolved to  local and individual levels. These 
processes have only intensified since the period when most of the above research 
was undertaken. The central state has further delegated its former responsibilities 
of providing and allocating social benefits to local governments (with the 2015 
transformations of the social aid system) and strengthened punitive elements (Ferge 
2014), abandoning an even larger segment of society (and villages), whose fates are 
now left entirely in their own hands. However, the lack of resources, due to decreasing 
central support and a lack of local assets, poses a problem in terms of tackling these 
insecurities, and often pushes both local governments and individuals to deal with 
them by finding immediate solutions, such as loans from Evident, bank loans, or 
informal credit in local shops, rather than by making long-term arrangements. 
Whereas to some degree the above-discussed processes have exacerbated anxiety 
and feelings of insecurity for many different groups in society, in the context of the 
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village the long-term unemployed are undoubtedly the most significantly affected. 
Furthermore, as the study has revealed, different groups can draw on very different 
resources and practices to cope with these insecurities. Informal credit and Evident 
loans constitute an important part of the social security arrangements for people 
who face unemployment or irregular employment and have limited access to other 
resources through local ties to strategically positioned persons. 
The different formal and informal practices that people use for their social security 
arrangements are strongly intertwined. As this paper has shown, formal and informal 
credit permeate different practices, ranging from cucumber-growing through house 
renovation to everyday consumption, and are used to deal with various insecurities 
related to child protection, crisis situations, and negotiating social belonging. As such, 
public norms of deservingness strongly influence who can access different resources 
and in what ways.   
Similarly, local governments like the one in Tiszacseke have also become 
increasingly indebted as they struggle to reconcile socioeconomic problems and carry 
out their mandatory duties in the face of a lack of appropriate resources, which makes 
long-term future planning/investment and structural changes unimaginable. The 
mayor believes that providing a certain level of social security through public work 
employment is an important job of the local government. However, in the face of 
shrinking central funding and the disadvantaged position of the village, it can only 
do so by taking away resources from other institutions and, for example, by offering 
advances on benefits instead of one-off aid in crisis situations. At the same time, it 
is due to the wide-scale public work programme that shopkeepers feel confident that 
the debts of their “best” customers will be balanced, and that, for the most part, loan 
sharks cannot be found in the village. However, as has been shown, even among the 
poorer groups this does not mean equal access to resources, as local advances and 
admittance to public work are largely dependent on the discretionary decisions of local 
officials, who are themselves influenced by public views about deservingness. Both the 
poor unemployed villagers and the disadvantaged local government are attempting 
to navigate a moral field of acceptable spending and informal credit practices amid 
the rescaled insecurities that permeate the present and possible futures of remote 
Hungarian villages.
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